[Editor’s Note: The following sequels are from For-Giving: A Feminist Criticism of Exchange by Genevieve Vaughan. Footnotes may differ from the original text.]
Giftgiving is the Ur-logic
Linguists and philosophers have sometimes thought of explaining language in terms of underlying logical structures–either a simpler language, which would still not explain how language itself works, or some other elementary structure or process. One such process was that of cause and effect. It was thought that it might be possible to reduce subject-verb- object structures to an underlying cause-and-effect structure. One example that was often used was ‘John killed Mary,’ which was given a ‘translation’ in cause-and- effect terms: ‘John caused Mary to die.’ I am often horrified at the (probably unconscious) hostility to women that can be found in linguists’ examples. Perhaps it is evidence of the guilt they feel in denying the mothering paradigm (Mary?) as an explanation for language. Cause-and-effect was found by most linguists not to be an appropriate process to which to reduce language, perhaps because it is not informative enough. It certainly does not carry with it the human relational consequences that giftgiving does.
I am proposing giftgiving as the logical process to which to reduce language. Not only can words be seen as need-satisfying gifts, but the syntactic structure of subject, predicate, object can be seen as deriving from giver, gift (or service), receiver. For example, in ‘The girl hit the ball,’ ‘girl’ is the giver, ‘hit’ is the gift, ‘ball’ is the receiver. The ‘translation’ would be, ‘The girl gave a hit to the ball.’
The intentionality of giftgiving can be found in many human actions and in the intentionality of speaking. A sense of motion and completeness which comes to us from a simple transitive sentence is similar to the motion and completeness that take place in giftgiving. In fact, giftgiving is transitive, a motion of something from one place or person to another. In the passive sentence ‘The ball was hit by the girl,’ emphasis is placed on the receiver rather than the giver of the gift.
Mothering is the necessary social process in the beginning of life, and this is also the time in which language learning takes place. Mothering is a cultural universal, required by the biologynot of adults, but of infants. To each different culture, mothering must appear simply part of the nature of things but, for the mothers, the need to nurture is social and its accomplishment is intentional. Women’s ability to give milk is a biological advantage that makes caretaking more convenient, but they must do the caretaking in a cultural context within social parameters. In mothering, there is an intentional transfer of goods and services from adult to child, from giver to receiver.
This experience is fundamental for children, because their lives depend upon it, and it is important and formative for the caretakers as well–if nothing else, because it is enormously time-consuming. It is not surprising that half of humanity is socialized from birth to do caretaking, because it requires a great deal of attention and commitment. A recent book, The Language Instinct, by Steven Pinker, attributes our linguistic capacity to a biological endowment. Similarly, mothering was considered instinctual until recently. In both cases, the logic of the gift is what is being covered by denial. The caretaking situation is more fundamental than the condition of objectivity. The experience of free gifts given by the mother and received by the child is more basic to the human being than is the knowledge of cause and effect. The mother is the giver–her care is the gift or service–and the child is the receiver. This process is laid down when the child is learning language in alignment with a syntactic structure of subject (giver), predicate (gift), object (receiver). If words are verbal gifts that satisfy constant social communicative needs, in the structure of an interpersonal speech situation, the speaker would be the giver, the words and sentences the gifts, and the listener the receiver. Sentences are combinations of words, satisfying contingent communicative needs. It would not be far-fetched to think that the word combination process might also take place according to the logic of the gift. The hypothesis that language is based on giftgiving and receiving allows us to look at many different levels at which they may occur, so that aspects of language which seem to be mysterious can be explained as elements of a gift process at some level. First, there is the level of material co-munication–the mother gives gifts or services to the child. Second, there is verbal communication–the mother talks to the child. Third, words are social gifts, each satisfying a constant communicative need. Fourth, words are combined into sentences, which satisfy contingent communicative needs. Fifth, the message and the topic may also be considered gifts, as when we satisfy someone’s need to know something or to talk about something. Sixth, at the level of syntax (within the sentence), the relation between subject, predicate and object re-traces the relation between giver, gift, and receiver.
It is important to look at this as a syntactic relation taking place at the level of words themselves, because at the level of things the words re-present, the ‘gift’ may be negative, as in ‘The boy hit the girl,’ or even ‘John killed Mary’ (translation: ‘John gave death to Mary’). At the level of material communication, such violence is contradictory and harmful, causing more grievous needs rather than satisfying needs. Nonetheless, at the level of sentence structure, the gift process can function independently from the level of experience. Thus, ‘The girl hit the ball,’ ‘Mother made a cake’ and ‘John killed Mary’ all have the same giver, gift, receiver sentence structure though on the level of reality, they are very different events.
At the syntactic level, we can also look at the relations between adjectives and nouns, adverbs and verbs, as relations between gifts and receivers. In ‘The brown dog ran fast to the gate,’ ‘brown’ is given to ‘dog’ and ‘fast’ to ‘ran.’ Philosophers used to say ‘brown’ was a ‘property’ of the dog, and fast would be a ‘property’ of its running. Brown can be called a ‘property’ because . . . it is given to the dog. This happens by allowing the word ‘brown’ to modify the word ‘dog,’ joining them as transposed gift and receiver in order to satisfy a contingent communicative need, arising from a dog of that color.
Linguists are used to following a mathematical, algebraic or scientific model, not a life model–but they still talk about words ‘filling the slots’ of other words in a phrase. We could look at the ‘slots’ as needs and the words as gifts satisfying them. If a word can only be related to a specific kind of other words (for instance, a determiner like ‘the’ can only be related to nouns), it is a kind of gift that can be given only to a certain kind of receiver. Only that kind of receiver has a need (‘slot’) for it. Some words or groups of words have to attach themselves to others; they cannot give their gifts alone, but serve or are served by another group.
For example, ‘to the gate’ has to serve; it cannot stand alone. It is not itself a gift transaction, or even a giver, but a gift to a gift. If bonds are formed between the receiver and the gift, perhaps we attribute the same process to our words. ‘Brown’ is given to ‘dog’ by the speaker for the moment, satisfying the communicative need arising from a brown dog. ‘Dog’ receives the gift of ‘brown’ and bonds with it for the present.
(To be Continued)
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